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Review and summary of evidence and experience of other countries’ health procurement 
(vaccines, drugs, medical supplies and medical equipment) in health sector decentralisation. 
What were the different approaches/models? What were the key lessons, outcomes and impact 
of the approach used? What worked? What did not?  
Contents 
1. Overview 
2. Introduction 
3. India 
4. Ghana 
5. Uganda and Bangladesh 
6. Brazil 
7. References 
 
  
2 
1. Overview 
Improving the efficiency, effectiveness, equity and responsiveness of supply chains and 
procurement processes for pharmaceuticals, vaccines and other health products, which make up 
a large share of total health expenditure in low and middle-income countries (LMICs), has 
important implications for health system performance and population health. Decentralised 
governance of health services provides greater autonomy in planning, management and decision 
making from national to sub-national level and has occurred in many LMICs largely as a 
response to the primary healthcare approach promoted by international agencies. Evidence 
suggests that procurement is more efficient when centralised because of economies of scale and 
improved purchasing power whilst other health system functions such as financing and 
planning/budgeting benefit more from local context-specific implementation. Nepal is embarking 
on a process of decentralisation after adopting a federal approach to local governance. This 
helpdesk report looks at other countries to summarise key findings and lessons learnt from 
decentralised procurement.   
Key findings are as follows:  
• Health system decentralisation can be implemented in different forms and to different 
extents depending on the existing political and public administrative structure of the 
country and the organisation of the health system itself. Most effective programmes that 
improve supply chain and procurement processes address the root causes of 
inefficiencies in the system and provide context-specific interventions.   
• Centralised procurement/tendering can achieve cost savings across multiple contexts by 
creating economies of scale and improved purchasing power. 
• A mixed procurement model can benefit health system performance with some functions 
decentralised, e.g. financing and planning/budgeting (as it is likely that these functions 
requires greater flexibility to respond to local information and can therefore benefit from 
greater local choice), and other functions centralised or at a higher level, e.g. inventory 
control, storage, logistics management information systems, transportation to transfer 
medicines (as these functions can benefit from oversight, storage capacity, etc.).  
• A mixed procurement model can also serve national and subnational programmes with 
the central level playing an essential role in the procurement, warehousing and 
distribution of select public health commodities e.g. contraceptives and vaccines. 
• The central level can also provide a useful vehicle to serve as the first in-bound 
warehouse for storing and breaking bulk orders from donors into smaller orders for 
downstream distribution to facilities. 
• Decentralisation can lead to a loss of drug quality oversight and regulation in 
procurement and across the supply chain. Petty collusions and corruption at the local 
purchasing level can also be an issue.  
• E-procurement can achieve savings and help overcome management concerns and 
corruptions issues when enabled by political support, pressures from citizens and groups 
for greater transparency and efficiency, and acceptance by suppliers. However, 
technological factors and legislative delays can be a challenge. 
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• The health workforce must be recognized as an important and adaptive factor 
contributing to the success or failure of health system reforms. 
2. Introduction 
Key policy questions on decentralisation in health relate to whether and in which ways health 
sector decentralisation can improve health outcomes. A large proportion of health spending in 
LMICs is on pharmaceutical, vaccines and other health products. Addressing costs, supply 
shortages (and treatment interruptions) in complex settings can be critical for strengthening 
health systems (Seidman & Atun, 2017). Changes to the procurement and supply chain 
processes include centralising or decentralising purchasing, improving data systems to monitor 
and inform purchasing (e.g. early-warning systems), improving infrastructure or processes along 
the supply chain to reduce wastage, and altering the methods for financing purchases.  
In 1998, Bossert proposed an analytical framework that can be used to design and evaluate the 
decentralisation of health systems (Thomas Bossert, 1998). This framework assumes that 
decentralisation is not an end in itself but rather should be designed and evaluated for its ability 
to achieve broader objectives of health reform: equity, efficiency, quality and financial soundness. 
This article presents a ‘decision space’ approach which defines decentralisation as a range of 
choices over a series of different functions allowed to officials at lower administrative levels. This 
approach evaluates the incentives that central government can offer to local decision-makers to 
encourage them to achieve health objectives; local government characteristics that influence 
decision-making and implementation at the local level (and whether local officials innovate by 
making choices that are different from those directed by central authorities); and whether the 
local choices have improved the performance of the local health system in achieving the broader 
health objectives.  
Two studies in Pakistan that used the decision space approach explored the relationships 
between three dimensions of decentralisation: the degree of local decision-making choice 
(“decision space”), individual and institutional capacities and local accountability (T. J. Bossert & 
Mitchell, 2011; T.J. Bossert, Mitchell, & Janjua, 2015). These studies found that targeted capacity 
building activities at the district level may contribute to improved decision-making and 
consequently improvements in health coverage and in better administration of the health system. 
Decentralisation was a varied experience between districts with some district-level officials 
making greater use of decision space than others, and those who did so also tended to have 
more capacity to make decisions and were held more accountable to elected local officials for 
such choices (T. J. Bossert & Mitchell, 2011). The authors suggest that Pakistan’s 
decentralisation policy should work towards achieving more uniform institutional capacity and 
encourage greater accountability to local elected officials.  
Five systematic reviews examining decentralisation on the health system that have been or are 
currently being written were found. Seidman and Atun conducted a systematic review 
investigating whether changes to supply chains and procurement processes can achieve cost 
savings and/or improve the availability of drugs in LMICs (Seidman & Atun, 2017). Improvements 
in the procurement and supply of health products were context-specific requiring different types 
of intervention in different countries. The authors suggest that policymakers should use a 
problem-driven approach to understand and address the root causes of problems in their drug 
procurement and supply systems to determine how to improve them. In contrast, centralised 
procurement/tendering achieved cost savings in the Middle East, Brazil, the Caribbean, Mexico, 
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other parts of Latin America and several countries in Asia and Africa. It also achieved cost 
savings when centralising procurement across countries, within a single country, or across 
multiple municipalities or health centres. These findings suggest that by creating economies of 
scale and improved purchasing power, centralised procurement and tendering can reduce health 
system costs in many contexts. Whilst the evidence suggests that centralised procurement has 
the potential to improve efficiency across multiple contexts, other efforts require more context-
specific implementation.  
Sumah, Baatiema and Abimbola conducted a systematic review of the impact of decentralisation 
on health-related equity (Sumah, Baatiema, & Abimbola, 2016). The review found that depending 
on context, decentralisation could either lead to equity gains or exacerbate inequities. The impact 
of decentralisation on inequities in health and healthcare depends on pre-existing socio-
economic disparities, organisational context and financial barriers to access. The 2016 review 
helps us better understand how health systems across the world have strengthened (or 
weakened) after implementing various forms of decentralisation in the health sector. Cobos 
Munoz et al. have examined the impacts of decentralisation in LMICs using the “six building 
blocks of health systems” framework of the World Health Organization; they found both positive 
and negative effects in the six building blocks and therefore mixed results (Cobos Munoz, Merino 
Amador, Monzon Llamas, Martinez Hernandez, & Santos Sancho, 2017).  
Cochrane Collaboration’s Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group (EPOC) has 
published a review protocol that aims to assess the effectiveness of decentralisation in improving 
access to health care, utilisation of health services, population health and other outcomes of 
interest (Sreeramareddy & Sathyanarayana, 2013), with the final report yet to be published. 
Finally, Liwang and Wyss are currently involved in a systematic review that aims to examine the 
effectiveness of decentralisation in improving health system performance (Liwanag & Wyss, 
2017). They caution that there must be a balance between minimising the risk of bias with what 
studies are realistic when assessing either the impact or effectiveness of decentralisation, which 
is often implemented as part of a public sector reform process in a country (Liwanag & Wyss, 
2017). Although study designs such as cross-sectional studies (and also qualitative studies) 
carry a risk of bias, such studies provide useful information to help explain why decentralisation 
succeeds or fails in achieving what it was intended for (effectiveness), or why outcomes are 
positive in some settings and negative in others (impacts) (Liwanag & Wyss, 2017).  
Decentralisation represents many complex and interconnected set of processes, typically 
context-specific, and should therefore be implemented and evaluated as a complex intervention 
(Sumah et al., 2016). No one form of decentralisation will be applicable for all settings, but rather 
it is important to understand what makes decentralisation positively impactful or effective for the 
health sector in some contexts and not in others. Sumah’s review is limited to only six countries 
(Spain, Canada, China, Switzerland, Chile and Columbia), suggesting that there is a lack of good 
studies on decentralisation in many other countries in the peer-reviewed literature.  
3. India 
Health care system  
Health is a state subject under the Indian Constitution. Each state therefore has its own 
healthcare delivery system in which both public and private (for profit as well as non-profit) actors 
operate. While states are responsible for the functioning of their respective healthcare systems, 
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certain responsibilities also fall on the federal (central) government, namely aspects of policy-
making, planning, guiding, assisting, evaluating and coordinating the work of various provincial 
health authorities and providing funding to implement national programmes.  
At the local level, Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs)—a decentralized system of local governance 
and their elected representatives participate in the functioning of district and sub-district 
institutions through various committees. Public actors in the Indian health care system include 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), state governments, and municipal and local 
level bodies. The ministry consists of the Department of Health and Family Welfare and 
Department of Health Research (Bhatia, 2014).  
The Directorate General of Health Services, an attached office of the Department of Health and 
Family Welfare, provides technical advice and is involved in the implementation of health 
schemes. Each state has its own State Directorate of Health Services and State Department of 
Health and Family Welfare, which is responsible for providing care to its population. District-level 
health services provide a link between each state and primary care services. 
Drug procurement system  
There is no single central government procurement office in India. The Medical Store 
Organisation (MSO), a subordinate wing of the Directorate General of Health Services under the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, is responsible for procurement of medicines and ensuring 
its availability to various health care organisations including central government scheme 
organisations. At present the Medical Stores Organisation consist of seven Government Medical 
Store Depots, located at Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Guwahati, Karnal and New 
Delhi. The depots at Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai have Chemical Testing Laboratories 
attached to them to ensure the quality of drugs purchased from the firms. MSO acquires drugs 
directly from pharma through tenders and distributes drugs supplied by international 
organisations.  
The Indian drug distribution system has a small number of layers: the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, clearing (or carrying) and forwarding agents (CFAs)/depots, super-stockists, 
stockists, wholesalers and retailers. The rationale for CFAs depends on the divisions between 
central and state taxation systems. Large pharmaceuticals have one or more CFA in each state. 
There is confusion regarding the role of CFAs: whether they work for one production company or 
can operate for several companies, sometimes over 50. The latter view is more prevalent among 
analysts.  The CFAs are the weakest link in the supply chain as they exist because of the 
taxation system, and new retail systems are trying to bypass CFAs and deal directly with the 
producers. The average fee of CFAs may be fixed or may depend on the turnover per year (2-
4%). Stockists market products for 6-8 pharmaceutical companies, however, given mergers 
among several pharma companies, the number of stockists per company has almost doubled, 
leading to quite tough competition among stockists at this distribution level. There are 
disagreements over the margins paid to the stockists. The estimated number of stockists in India 
is over 60,000. The rest of the market is made up of retailers/pharmacies/dispensers who often 
also work as prescribers. These accounts for approximately 70-80% of the market and the rest 
are sold directly through hospital pharmacies. Retailers comprise a wide variety, from small 
shops to retail chains.  
In India, the public and private procurement systems run in parallel. It is generally assumed that 
the private sector and NGO procurement are much smaller than state and federal procurement. 
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The MSO is responsible for vaccines received from international organisations and for national 
eradication programs. The majority of the public sector procurement system is carried out by 
state governments and their practices vary across the country. The armed forces and railways 
have separate medical depots under the central government that are contracted independently. 
There is also a Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) for retired and serving government 
employees in which MSOs are responsible for procurement.  
Diagrammatic representation of channels of drug distribution in India 
 
 Source: Jeffery R. et.al Pharmaceuticals distribution systems in India. Working paper 1a. July 2007. (as represented)(Jeffrey, 
2007) 
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Current distribution set up in India 
 
Source: (Jeffrey, 2007) (as represented)  
Deficiencies in the existing system 
India’s pharmaceutical drug regulation system is fractured. Drug monitoring in the country is 
sparse; it is split between far too many agencies—36 independent state regulators, and one 
central. The country lacks a cohesive policy governing the procurement and recall of drugs. The 
reasons behind this fragmented system are many. Firstly, under the 7th Schedule of the 
Constitution, public health, sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries are listed as matters on which 
state governments can legislate. This allows them to develop their own regulatory policy and not 
be held accountable by any central body. Secondly, there are no overarching laws protecting 
procurement or recalling ‘not of standard quality drugs’- those that do not meet the dosage and 
quality standards. Without any coherent policies, the pharma companies continue to make 
money at the cost of patients’ health through the supply of low standard drugs. In the absence of 
a central policy, the states have their own individual procurement policies and have failed to build 
consensus between states. Similarly, the armed forces and railways have their own hospitals 
with individual policies for buying medicines. This results in malpractice at several levels. The 
companies on the approved register of armed forces receive requests to submit tenders, 
including tendering for the supply of medicines from big pharma companies that are registered 
with the armed forces for supply. The decisions to give tenders are largely based on ‘drug price’ 
– a system that leads to accessing the cheapest drugs possible.  
The Government of India carried out an audit in 2007, which found that 80% of the drugs were 
secured by domestic suppliers and, contrary to the specifications of the Health Ministry, local 
authorities had foregone the practice of drawing samples for testing: most central government 
hospitals relied on reports submitted by the suppliers. This meant that most patients consumed 
sub-standard drugs. The audit in 2012 for the Armed Forces Medical Stores found that the share 
of sub-standard drugs rose from 15% in 2006-2007 to 31% in 2010-2011. A similar audit in 2014 
found that out of 20 railways hospitals, six prescribed drugs before receipt of the lab results and 
certified them as ‘standard quality medicine’. 
Manufacturer 
Depot/CFA 
Stockists 
Hospitals Pharmacies 
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Lessons from different procurement models in different states 
The rationale for providing cheaper drugs has been to keep out-of-pocket expenditures for 
patients as low as possible, given that over 68% of people in India have limited access to 
essential medicines. Singh et.al (2013) compared five states in India based on the type of 
procurement models (centralised, decentralised and mixed), and looking for low financial burden, 
good quality, timely availability, minimal wastage and transparency (Singh, Tatambhotla, 
Kalvakuntla, & Chokshi, 2013). They found that for centralised pooled procurement models such 
as in Tamil Nadu, Kerela and Odhisha, it is imperative to have an optimum number of 
warehouses for all public health facilities as well as adequate transportation to transfer 
medicines.  
Establishing IT systems for managing and monitoring the entire system is critical. Maharashtra 
follows a centralised rate for contracting but decentralised purchasing where suppliers directly 
deliver the medicines to the facilities. Transportation costs are not borne by the state but are built 
into the drug price. This system also requires significant investment in storage facilities in each 
institution. Punjab follows a mixed system of centralised purchasing but gets user charges 
collected by district hospitals which are then utilised to buy drugs from open market. 
To save limited financial resources, centralised systems focus on Essential Drugs List and 
reduce costs through volume discounts. However, bulk discounts do not necessarily lead to 
cheaper drug pricing, as seen in Tamil Nadu, Odisha. Other factors such as suppliers’ location 
are impacting on drug pricing. Effective inventory management was highlighted as key to 
reducing wastage of medicine. In Kerala, the initial order only contains 70-75% of the required 
quantity, and is followed by a second purchase order to avoid wastage and spacing issues. 
Manual recording of purchases not only leads to increase in inaccuracies but also wastage of 
materials and space. In centralised procurement, distribution is managed centrally and it is the 
responsibility of the procurement agency to ensure availability of drugs at user institutions. 
However, in decentralised models such as in Punjab and Maharashtra, the supply is sporadic for 
various reasons such as improper planning, delayed payments, etc.  
A procurement organisation has two levers to ensure that only quality drugs enter the system: (1) 
prequalification criteria to filter out unqualified suppliers, and (2) external quality testing protocols. 
When these levers are used together, quality is ensured while still keeping the prices low. Tamil 
Nadu and Kerala have empanelled laboratories for sample quality testing before distribution, but 
Maharashtra and Odisha rely on suppliers’ internal quality certificates. In order to improve 
efficiency and accountability in procurement, Tamil Nadu and Kerala have autonomous 
organisations within the public sector and headed by a civil servant with technical expertise. 
Odisha, Punjab and Maharashtra have procurement cells as part of the Directorate of Health 
Services of the state government. A clear difference between the efficiencies of the processes of 
procurement is visible between autonomous and state-run organisations.  
4. Ghana 
Health care system  
Health sector reform took place in Ghana from 1998 to 2002 under the Health Sector Support 
Project (HSSP) and, supported by the World Bank, it continued under another five-year medium-
term health strategy from 2002 to 2006. Multiple health reform initiatives were implemented, most 
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notably the decentralisation of health management and the integration of supply systems to 
improve management efficiency and to better respond to local population health needs. The 
central level still plays an essential role in several vertical treatment programmes that are intrinsic 
to public health, including vaccines, family planning commodities and bed nets. Otherwise, 
Ghana’s pharmaceutical procurement and supply is mostly decentralized. Budget management 
centres (BMC) were established to autonomously set and manage budgets. Each BMC is 
responsible for making procurement decisions, with guidance from the MOH Procurement 
Procedure Manual (Ministry of Health Ghana, July 2004) on committee formation, bid evaluation, 
specification and roles and responsibilities. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was 
introduced in 2005 to replace the “cash and carry system” to provide an equitable insurance 
scheme that ensured that treatment was provided first before payment. 
In theory, the BMCs use their revolving funds to purchase essential drugs from the public 
medical stores – Central Medical Stores, Regional Medical Stores or District Medical Stores 
(CMS, RMS or DMS). A BMC goes directly to the medical stores to purchase, collect and 
transport drugs. In some cases, the medical stores may reject the order if it seems inappropriate 
(too much in volume for the target population of a facility, or non-essential drugs for that facility 
level, or if the facility does not have personnel skilled in use of that drug) or may not be able to 
provide the drugs because they do not have them in stock. In the latter case, this is supposed to 
result in the issuing of a ‘non-availability certificate’ which authorises the BMC to purchase drugs 
from the private sector (the procurement committee formed by the Regional Health Authority can 
shop locally for supplies, comparing prices and quality for consignments worth under $50,000 or 
go out to tender for orders larger than $50,000; with lower level facilities following a similar 
approach) (Sarley et al., July 2003).  
However, results from a survey conducted in 2003 showed that more than 50 percent of 
medicines came from the private sector because of factors such as lower prices and better 
quality, availability and packaging (Sarley et al., July 2003). Thus, in practice, the guidelines are 
not always followed with the BMC often going directly to the private sector, whether they have a 
non-availability certificate or not (Saleh, 2013). The CMS does provide at least 30 percent of the 
country’s needs, but a strategic approach is lacking on the supply chain: policy requires direct 
delivery by CMS to regional stores, but in practice most regional stores use their own 
transportation to get supplies (Saleh, 2013). The CMS also continues to play a critical role in the 
procurement, warehousing and distribution of select public health commodities (e.g. 
contraceptives and vaccines) and most donors rely on CMS to serve as the first in-bound 
warehouse for storing and breaking bulk orders into smaller orders for downstream distribution to 
facilities (Saleh, 2013).  
Decentralised procurement and the introduction of the NHIS have increased access to drugs but 
drug prices have significantly gone up, creating cost inefficiencies. In 2007, Ghana procured 
drugs at 150 percent of the international drug reference price, compared with approximately 79 
percent in 1993 (Sarley et al., July 2003). High prices were attributed to: (a) decentralised 
procurement of drugs at the district and sub-district level which did not benefit from economies of 
scale, (b) NHIS’s drug pricing policy which dictates pricing at a median range of the current 
Ghana market rather than attaching it to MOH’s mark-up policies or to international reference 
pricing, and (c) the difficulty of enforcing price regulations (Saleh, 2013). The MOH policy that 
enables districts and health facilities to retain internally generated funds (IGFs) and the flexibility 
to use IGFs for procurement of drugs has improved access to drugs but procurement of smaller 
quantities at one time has resulted in increased drug prices (Saleh, 2013).  
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Several studies have shown that the CMS could purchase well below international prices, mainly 
because of economies of scale in purchasing bulk orders, but reduced capital made it unable to 
conduct its mandate of procurement and distribution (Saleh, 2013). Pooled procurement at 
national and regional levels would help control prices and ensure better quality of drugs (Saleh, 
2013). Saleh suggests in his 2013 World Bank report that Ghana could reinvent MOH’s central 
procurement unit for drugs, commodities and medical equipment into a Group Purchasing 
Organisation (GPO) and technical services department. The GPO could negotiate and develop 
contracts on behalf of Ghana’s health facilities, provide quality oversight across the supply chain 
and provide technical support in helping MOH monitor what medicines are available and 
affordable to ultimately improve pricing efficiency (Saleh, 2013). The GPO could also reduce the 
possibility of petty collusions and corruption at the local purchasing level.  
About one-half of all NHIS claims payments are for drugs (Saleh, 2013). This increasing share is 
seen to be a result of: (a) decentralised procurement of drugs and limited benefits from 
economies of scale, (b) limited monitoring and enforcement of drug pricing mark-ups, (c) limited 
control over prescriptions, and (d) prescribing behaviour in favour of more expensive drugs. Drug 
prices could be controlled through better enforcement, monitoring and an NHIS pricing list that 
strictly adheres to drug pricing policies and mark-ups. Less than half of Ghana’s population has 
insurance (Saleh, 2013). Approximately half are paying for their health care out of pocket (OOP), 
and they are expected to pay at or above market prices. 
Logistic system decentralisation 
DELIVER and the Harvard School of Public Health designed a series of studies to be 
implemented in six countries to assess the impact of decentralisation and integration of decision-
making authority to regional and district levels on the logistics management and distribution of 
essential drugs, contraceptives and vaccines. The second study was in Ghana. Using the 
decision space model, the study found that greater decision space was related to better 
performance for financing and planning/budgeting; and worse performance was related to 
procurement, inventory control, storage, logistics management information systems, training, and 
client contact (T Bossert, Dowser, Amenyah, & Copeland, 2004). Comparing the findings from 
this study with those from the first study conducted in Guatemala (T. J. Bossert, Bowser, 
Amenyah, Copeland, & GETSA, 2003), moderate ranges of choice over financing and 
planning/budgeting are associated with better performance for those functions, as it is likely that 
planning and budgeting requires greater flexibility to respond to local information, whilst inventory 
control, LMIS and storage should remain centralised. No logistics system is fully centralised or 
decentralised and Bossert et al (2004) tentatively suggest that more local choice should be 
granted over some functions whilst central control over other functions should be retained.  
5. Uganda and Bangladesh 
Health care systems  
Bangladesh became a parliamentary democracy in 1991 after 20 years under a military regime. 
A wide programme of reforms was initiated in response to a rigid central government structure 
and disagreement between the main parties inhibiting the response to local health needs. The 
main reforms involved unifying the two separate divisions of health services and family planning 
with the intention of improving their efficiency and responsiveness to the user population.   
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Uganda implanted a series of reforms after the health service mostly collapsed in the 1970s and 
1980s. Decentralisation of service delivery and accompanying reforms in the civil service were 
both aimed at making the central and local authorities function efficiently and democratically.  
Human resource issues 
Health reform initiatives have not always considered human resource issues that are relevant to 
their success and have often failed to include participation or perspectives of health workers in 
reform planning processes and decision-making. Health sector reform must include the 
participation or perspectives of the health workforce in reform planning processes and decision-
making (Martineau & Buchan, 2000). Ssengooba et al. explore the mechanisms through which 
health sector reforms either promote or discourage health worker performance (Ssengooba et 
al., 2007). Their paper presents findings from a comparative analysis of two country case studies 
investigating the impact of health sector reforms on human resources in Bangladesh and 
Uganda. In both Uganda and Bangladesh reform planners neglected the role of context in their 
planning of reform objectives and assumed that the workforce would act as a passive element in 
reform implementation.  
In Bangladesh, the separate logistical management systems of the health and family planning 
services were replaced by an integrated logistical system, including unified arrangements for 
procurement, storage, distribution and transportation. The aim was to improve service quality, 
motivate employees to perform better and reduce cost, however, quality and motivation problems 
persisted and drug shortages continued. Drug shortages and general procurement failures 
emerged as a source of bad public relations between the health workforce and the communities 
despite originating in broader systemic problems such as financing and budget constraints that 
preceded the initiation of reform objectives.  
In Uganda, rapid decentralisation failed to provide sufficient competence for human resource 
management. However, closer ties between health workers and community leaders was positive 
with a greater understanding by the community, who expected smooth running services and 
consistent availability of drugs and equipment, of the limitations health workers face because of 
budget constraints and procurement failures at higher levels of the system. The experience of 
health sector reform in Bangladesh and Uganda highlights the importance of careful analysis of 
contextual factors in the design and implementation of reform objectives and the significance of 
recognising the workforce as an important and adaptive factor contributing to the success or 
failure of the reforms.  
Key points from their paper are as follows (Ssengooba et al., 2007): 
1. By keeping the dynamic responses model in mind, national and international reform 
planners can design reform objectives that ultimately enhance and improve services as 
felt by the communities by encouraging favourable responses amongst the workforce. 
2. Reform planners need to take a closer look at the context within which the health system 
operates in order to recognise potential 'inhospitable elements' which may hinder reform 
objectives or 'hospitable elements’ which may support reform initiatives and provide a 
basis for improvements in the operation and management of health systems. 
3. Reform programmes need to incorporate active implementation research systems to 
learn the contextual dynamics and responses, as well as have inbuilt programme 
capacity for corrective measures. 
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4. Health workers are key stakeholders in any reform process and should participate at all 
stages, that is, conceptualisation, design and implementation. Reforms tend to create 
losers and winners or can change power structures but it is important, at the least, that 
winners and losers understand the purpose of change and have confidence in the 
process of consultations on which change has been determined. 
5. How health workers perceive their relationship with the community will affect their job 
motivation and performance. This is an important but neglected criterion for evaluating 
the impact of human sector reforms. 
6. Brazil 
Health care system  
Brazil has a mixed health system formed by a large public health system, the SUS (Unified 
Health System), the health supplemental companies, and out-of-pocket payments. The public 
system is one of universal coverage, so every Brazilian citizen can use it at no additional cost. In 
addition to public hospitals and clinics, SUS oversees the distribution of publicly funded 
medicines that are listed on Brazil’s Essential Medicines List (EML), as well as medicines for rare 
diseases and those affecting small groups (e.g. anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B 
and C). Brazil has one of the largest healthcare systems in the world, committed to universal 
access to medicines. 
Even with this guaranteed right to health, included in the country’s constitution, 25 percent of the 
population (about 49 million people) have health insurance - though they are still entitled to use 
the public system (Branco de Araújo & Stefani, 2014).  
Drug procurement system 
In 1998 the National Medicine Policy was published that also includes medicine procurement and 
availability and utilisation in the health system. The procurement system in Brazil is a complex 
administrative process and it is conducted independently by more than 5,500 municipalities, 26 
states and the Federal District and the federal government as well as hospitals under indirect 
public administration (Chama Borges Luz, Garcia Serpa Osorio-de-Castro, Magarinos-Torres, & 
Wettermark, 2017). This means that in Brazil both the manufacturers and wholesalers can supply 
hospitals (both private and public) and public administration. The pricing of the drug is subject to 
the approval of the Pharmaceutical Market Regulatory Board (CMED) which is made up of 
representatives from given ministries and supported by staff based in the Health Surveillance 
Agency (Anvisa). Generally, public hospitals and administrations are required to run biddings 
whose pricing is formalised by CMED’s wholesale prices. However, the margin for pharmacists’ 
discretion in public health facilities is constrained by the procurement rules and decisions of the 
procurement staff through both open and negotiated procedures for procurement (Fiuza, Ferraz, 
& Mour˜ao, 2015).  
The secretariat of Logistics and Information Technology in the Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management established an e-procurement system (COMPRASNET). This is a web-based 
online procurement system used by all the federal government procurement units. Federal 
entities register their procurement needs (both goods and services) and the system then 
automatically informs registered suppliers by email so they can download bidding information. 
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Auctions and prices are open for inspection by the public, and auction results are posted 
immediately. E-procurement is intended to provide an instrument for social control of public 
expenditure through its public transparency, accountability, efficiency and efficacy (Ozorio de 
Almeida, 2002). Sigulem and Zucchi conducted a study to evaluate the use of e-procurement to 
obtain supplies for a network of seven university hospitals with a joint purchase system (Sigulem 
& Zucchi, 2009). The focus/factors examined by the study included pricing, number of suppliers 
quoting, unit price, type of supplier etc. The results showed that the e-procurement was 
successful in achieving real savings and helped to overcome management concerns and 
corruption issues.  
Enablers and barriers to e-procurement  
Enablers-  
• Political will inside the government; 
• External pressures from citizens and groups for greater transparency and efficiency; 
• Acceptance by suppliers. 
Barriers/Challenges 
• Technological factors causing disruption or temporary unavailability of the system; 
• Legislative delays caused by new legislation and rules to allow for new forms of 
procurement.  
Good governance is essential to a healthy health system but corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement is always a threat (Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, & Parris, 2000). This includes 
collusion in bidding, “fixed” procurement bidding and kickbacks to public officials to gain support 
for a bid. To address corruption in procurement, and especially in pharmaceutical procurement 
practices, governments across the globe are turning to good governance measures such as drug 
pricing transparency. Kohler et al. (2015) examined whether Brazil’s approach to increasing 
pricing transparency resulted in lower drug prices over time (Kohler, Mitsakakis, Saadat, Byng, & 
Martinez, 2015). The authors could extract such drug pricing information from a governmental 
online database (BPS), to which reporting of procurement pricing information, at the federal level, 
is mandatory. Analysis of the effect that pricing transparency has had on drug purchase prices in 
two socioeconomically different Brazilian states, Paraiba and Sao Paulo, over a five-year period 
was carried out. The results showed that although BPS allowed more transparency in drug 
pricing, there were no consistent reductions in drug purchase prices.  
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